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Abstract—Wireless communication systems, such as wireless
sensor networks and RFIDs, are increasingly adopted to transfer
potential highly sensitive information. Since the wireless medium
has a sharing nature, adversaries have a chance to eavesdrop con-
fidential information from the communication systems. Adding
artificial noises caused by friendly jammers emerges as a feasible
defensive technique against adversaries. This paper studies the
schedule strategies of friendly jammers, which are randomly and
redundantly deployed in a circumscribed geographical area and
can be unrechargeable or rechargeable, to maximize the lifetime
of the jammer networks and prevent the cracking of jamming
effect made by the eavesdroppers, under the constraints of
geographical area, energy consumption, transmission power, and
threshold level. An approximation algorithm as baseline is first
proposed using the integer linear programming model. To further
reduce the computational complexity, a heuristic algorithm based
on the greedy strategy that less consumption leads to longer
lifetime is also proposed. Finally, extensive simulation results
show that the proposed algorithms are effective and efficient.
I. MOTIVATION
In recent years, wireless communication technology has
been widely used in our daily life. Wireless communication
systems, such as wireless sensor networks and RFIDs, are
increasingly adopted to transfer potential highly sensitive
information [1], [2]. Since the wireless medium has a sharing
nature, there exist great challenges in securing the sensitive
information transferred by wireless communication systems,
and adversaries have opportunities to attack the systems or
eavesdrop confidential information from the systems.
Recently, a few researchers focus on utilizing artificial
noises caused by friendly jammers to secure wireless com-
munication systems. Karim et.al. proposed a method for
deploying minimum number of jammers powered by a central
power station to secure the wireless communication systems in
a circumscribed geographical area [3]. The method works well
in the case that the adversaries can not enter the circumscribed
geographical area but can attack or eavesdrop the wireless
communication when they are near the area. To minimize
power consumption of jammers, [3], [4] further proposed
excellent methods. However, the optimal geographical lay-
outs of jammers given in [3] are unchangeable. Thus, the
jamming effect produced by the methods could be cracked
by eavesdroppers with strong capability [5]. Moreover, this
system depends heavily on a central power supply, conse-
quently is unavailable when power failure arises. To solve
these problems, we suggest an alternative method by randomly
and redundantly deploying battery-powered jammers first, and
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Fig. 1: An example Storage/Fence environment model
then dynamically scheduling the activities of jammers to
secure the wireless communication systems and prevent the
cracking of jamming effect made by the eavesdroppers. The
critical open problem of the alternative method is the problem
of optimally scheduling the redundant jammers for securing
wireless communication. Further more, rechargeable jammers
can also be used to prolong the survival time of jammer
networks.
This paper focuses on the problem of optimally scheduling
jammers, which are randomly and redundantly deployed and
can be unrechargeable or rechargeable, for wireless communi-
cation security in a circumscribed geographical area to prevent
the cracking of jamming effect made by the eavesdroppers and
maximize the lifetime of the jammer networks. As shown in
Figure 1, we consider the same Storage/Fence environment
model as in [3]. The storage, S, is a closed geographic
region where legitimate communication takes place. Around
the storage is a fence F that is used to physically prevent
eavesdroppers from entering the area. Jammers, denoted by
J , are randomly and redundantly deployed in F\S to cause
interference. We use Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio
(SINR), the ratio of the power of the transmitted signal to
that of the interference caused by jammers, to describe the
jamming effect. Based on various node characteristics, differ-
ent thresholds can be determined to decide whether a receiver
can hear the legitimate communication or not. Specifically,
a legitimate receiver is not disturbed if the SINR of it is
greater than a threshold δ1, and an eavesdropper is successfully
interfered if the SINR of it is less than another threshold δ2.
The paper [3] proved that it is only needed to consider the
boundary of S and F in the above model. Precisely speaking,
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(i) all of the eavesdroppers located outside the fence are
jammed successfully if every eavesdropper on the bound-
ary of fence F is jammed, and
(ii) all of the legitimate receivers inside S are not jammed if
any receiver on the boundary of storage S is not jammed.
With a slight abuse of notation, we refer to the boundary
of storage as S and the boundary of fence as F . Then the
above description about the two threshold constraints can be
formulated as
∀s ∈ S, SINR(s) = PT∑
j∈J PJ ‖j − s‖−γ
≥ δ1, (1)
∀p ∈ F, SINR(p) = PT d(p, S)
−γ∑
j∈J PJ ‖j − p‖−γ
≤ δ2. (2)
Here PT and PJ are the transmission powers of legitimate
nodes and jammers, respectively, ‖j − s‖ is the Euclidean
distance between j and s, γ is the path loss exponent, and
the minimum distance between p and S is denoted by d(p, S).
Since the legitimate nodes inside S are close to each other, the
path loss between legitimate nodes can be ignored for brevity.
Note that both unrechargeable and rechargeable jammers
are taken into account in this paper. Unrechargeable jammers
have two modes, active or sleeping. When an unrechargeable
jammer is active, it causes interference and consumes energy
at a certain rate c; when in sleeping mode, it is silent and
has no energy consumption. Rechargeable jammers have three
modes, active, sleeping, or charging. A rechargeable jammer
acts the same as unrechargeable jammer does when it is active
or sleeping, and it does not cause interference and gains energy
at rate 1 when it is charging.
If we can find a series of disjoint sets of rechargeable
jammers, which can be activated in a round-robin fashion
to satisfy the given constraints, then the jammer network
could continue working forever. Detailed analysis for this is
presented in Section VI. Unfortunately, since the budget is
usually restricted in real life and the rechargeable jammers
are much costlier than unrechargeable ones, the proportion
of rechargeable jammers should be quite limited. So it is
reasonable to assume that the total energy of the jammer net-
work would run out eventually, even though some rechargeable
jammers can be recharged. In this work, we are interested
in developing feasible scheduling solutions that maximize the
survival time of the jammer network.
In summary, the key contributions of this paper are listed
as follows:
(i) We formulate the scheduling of friendly jammers into an
optimization problem to maximize the survival time of
the jammer network under the constraints of geograph-
ical area, energy consumption, transmission power, and
threshold level.
(ii) We present an approximation algorithm and a greedy
heuristic algorithm to solve the optimization problem.
(iii) We find that the integer linear programming (ILP) can
be used as a step in the above two algorithms.
(iv) Simulation results show that the proposed algorithms are
effective and efficient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
outlines the related works. Section III defines the optimization
problem. Section IV proves that the optimization problem is
NP-hard. Our heuristic and approximate scheduling algorithms
are proposed in Section V and analyzed in Section VI.
Experimental results are presented in Section VII. Section VIII
concludes the full paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Wireless communication security has been well studied in
recent years. The well-known conventional way for security
is to use cryptography technique in the upper layers [6].
However, these approaches are impractical in many wireless
communication systems, such as wireless sensor networks and
RFIDs, due to the limited computing capacity of sensor nodes
and the risk of secret key to be eavesdropped. Then jammers,
once used by adversaries to interfere wireless communication
[7]–[9], were introduced to prevent confidential information
from being wiretapped.
There are a vast amount of extant works on friendly
jammers in the literature. Vilela et.al. showed that contention
of jammers can be used for secrecy and proposed several
jammer selection policies to optimize the secure throughput in
the wireless networks [10]. The model contains only one pair
of legitimate transmitter and receiver. Secret keys were used
to control the jamming signals, such that the jamming signals
are unpredictable to unauthorized devices but recoverable by
authorized ones [11]. The method is impractical if the secret
keys are eavesdropped by bad devices. The authors of [12]
focused on the design of optimal jamming configurations
based on channel state information. [13] aimed at finding the
largest number of jammers that do not cause collisions among
themselves. The problem can be reduced into the maximum
independent set problem. The author did not consider energy
consumption. New authentication mechanisms by integrating
jamming into the communication protocol were proposed in
[14]. Relay nodes were utilized to send codewords, which are
independent of the source message, to confuse the eavesdrop-
pers [15]. A game theoretical approach that the source pays
the jammers to interfere the eavesdroppers was introduced in
[16]. The authors of [17], [18] focused on the strategy of
power allocating between transmitting data and broadcasting
interference. Even though there are so many works on friendly
jammers, most of them only considered the communication
security between a pair of transmitter and receiver and ignored
the geographical conditions. This is unrealistic in real life.
The most related works about the problem of optimally
scheduling jammers, which are randomly and redundantly
deployed, for wireless communication security are as follows.
Allouche et.al. proposed a scheme to secure wireless commu-
nication through temporal jammers deployed in a restricted
geographical area [4]. Each jammer becomes active with
a certain probability on bit instants. The scheme uses bit-
error probability as a measure of communication quality. The
problem aims at computing a probability for each jammer to
make sure that the eavesdropper’s channel quality is degraded
sufficiently while the legitimate communication is protected.
However, the assumption of temporal jammers poses some
challenging issues for hardware design. Arkin et.al. focused
on the problem of placing a minimum number of fixed power
jammers in a geographic region [19]. SINR is used as the
measure of communication quality. The problem is proved to
be NP-hard and an ILP-based (1 + )-approximation scheme
is proposed to solve the problem. However, the author did not
consider energy consumption, not to mention the scheduling
strategy of jammers to maximize lifetime. Karim et.al. stud-
ied strategies for allocating and managing friendly jammers
in geographically restricted areas [3]. The first optimization
problem, described by linear programming, aims at assigning
powers to a set of fixed jammers such that the total power
assigned is minimized. The second problem is to place a
minimum number of jammers with the same power. The
problem is modeled as ILP and a PTAS algorithm is proposed.
However, since the optimal geographical layout of jammers is
unchangeable, the jamming effect produced by the methods
could be cracked by eavesdroppers with strong capability [5].
Moreover, the system depends heavily on a central power
supply, and hence is unavailable when power failure arises.
The issue of extending operational time of battery-powered
wireless sensor networks was investigated in [20]. The basic
idea is to first organize sensors into a maximal number
of disjoint set covers, and then activate these sets in turn
successively to monitor all targets. A heuristic algorithm based
on mixed integer programming was then proposed to compute
the sets. This work is on target monitoring by sensors, not on
communication protecting with friendly jammers. Moreover,
the assumption that the locations of all targets are known
in advance is unrealistic in protecting communication with
friendly jammers since the locations of the eavesdroppers are
not fixed and often unknown. Battery-powered rechargeable
networks have also drawn a lot of attention among researchers
[21]–[26]. Although these works mainly focused on energy
harvesting in sensor networks, they provided a new perspective
for the security of wireless communication by rechargeable
jammers.
In summary, there have been a lot of works on wireless
communication security by friendly jammers, and some of
them concentrate on communication security in geographically
restricted areas. However, it has never been investigated and
remains open problem to optimally schedule jammers to pre-
vent the cracking of jamming effect made by the eavesdroppers
and to maximize the survival time of the jammer networks in
a circumscribed geographical region.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
The basic geographic settings in this paper are as follows.
S is a closed storage, which is surrounded by a fence F .
Friendly jammers, denoted by J , are randomly and redun-
dantly deployed in the region F\S. For simplicity, we assume
that all the legitimate transmitters have an identical transmis-
sion power PT and all the friendly jammers share the same
jamming power PJ . Suppose that time is divided into identical
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Fig. 2: An example jamming schedule
slots, and energy is splitted into units. During each time slot
a jammer consumes c units of energy if active, or gains one
unit of energy when charging.
Let Ri ⊆ J . We say the set of jammers Ri is reliable, if
the following constraints are satisfied with only jammers in
Ri being active simultaneously.
∀s ∈ S, SINR(s) = PT∑
j∈Ri PJ ‖j − s‖
−γ ≥ δ1, (3)
∀p ∈ F, SINR(p) = PT d(p, S)
−γ∑
j∈Ri PJ ‖j − p‖
−γ ≤ δ2. (4)
The family of reliable sets of jammers is denoted by R =
{Ri | Ri ⊆ J and Ri is reliable}. A jamming schedule can be
defined as a sequence of reliable jammer sets D1, D2, · · · , Dl,
where Di ∈ R and Di is activated in the ith time slot. It
is worth to note that, a jammer could be covered by several
different reliable sets, but each set is activated for only one
slot. For instance, as shown in Figure 2, all jammers in D1 are
activated in the first slot and each jammer consumes c units
of energy; then D1 stops working and D2 is activated in the
second slot, and so on.
With jammers dying gradually due to energy consumption,
let’s consider a situation where no such reliable subset of
J can be found after the lth slot, and we refer to this case
as DEAD. The lifetime of the whole jammer network is
defined as the maximum number of time slots before DEAD.
Various schedules result in different lifetimes of a jammer
network. By appropriately scheduling, rechargeable jammers
can be recharged in turn before running out of energy, and
hence prolongs the lifetime of the whole jammer network.
The problem of optimally scheduling jammers is to find a
jamming schedule D1, D2, · · · , Dl such that the lifetime of a
given jammer network is extended as much as possible, hence
l is maximized.
In the next section, we prove that the problem is NP-hard.
In Section V, first we propose an approximation algorithm
as baseline, and then a greedy heuristic algorithm based on
ILP is presented to solve the problem of optimally scheduling
jammers.
IV. HARDNESS OF THE PROBLEM
In our optimal jammers scheduling problem, we need to
select a subset of jammers from J in each time slot to ensure
the constraints (3) and (4) are satisfied. In the most general
case, both unrechargeable jammers and rechargeable jammers
constitute the whole jammer set J together, and each jammer
has a certain life span. Let’s consider a special case derived
from the above general case, i.e., all of the jammers in J are
unrechargeable and all jammers share the identical life span
1. That means, each jammer could be chosen to be active
for only one time slot and then would die. Then we have a
special problem with only unrechargeable jammers randomly
distributed in the region F\S to cause interference to secure
the legitimate communication inside the storage S.
Since the jammer set J is limited, we can find out all of
the reliable subsets of J , denoted by Ri (i = 1, 2, · · · ). Let
R = {R1, R2, · · · , Rm} be the set of those reliable subsets.
Apparently, Ri ⊂ J . Then selecting a subset of jammers to
satisfy (3) and (4) is equivalent to choosing a set from R.
Since the life span of each jammer is 1, a jammer could be
chosen to work only once. Thus the special problem is easily
converted to the classical maximum independent set problem.
Now we construct a graph G = (V,E) based on R as
follows:
(i) add each Ri ∈ R to V as a vertex, and
(ii) ∀Ri, Rj ∈ R, if Ri ∩ Rj 6= φ, then add (Ri, Rj) to E
as an edge.
Remember that ∀x ∈ J , x could be chosen only once. In other
words, at most one of any two adjacent vertexes in G could be
chosen. The original optimal goal is to maximize the number
of chosen subsets of J , which is equivalent to choosing
the most adjacent vertexes in graph G. Thus, the special
problem is reduced to the maximum independent set problem
whose complexity is NP-Complete. Thus the complexity of
the original problem is at least NP-Complete.
However, when rechargeable jammers and multiple life span
of jammers are considered, the problem becomes much more
complicated. Based on the analysis above, the computational
complexity of our original problem of optimally scheduling
jammers is NP-hard.
V. ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose an approximation algorithm,
called minimum reliable set algorithm (MRS for short), as
baseline, and a greedy heuristic algorithm to solve the problem
of optimally scheduling jammers. In the MRS algorithm,
we first compute a family of special reliable subsets of
jammers, called minimum reliable set. Then the problem can
be modeled as an integer linear programming problem based
on the calculated minimum reliable set, which can be solved
by an existing polynomial time algorithm with a certain
approximation ratio. Note that the MRS algorithm is specially
designed for situations where there are only unrechargeable
jammers in the network. The heuristic algorithm is based on
an intuitive greedy strategy that the less energy is consumed in
each time slot, the longer the lifetime of the jammer network
will be. The algorithm greedily computes a reliable subset
of jammers, Di ∈ R, with the minimum energy decrease in
each iteration. This process will not stop until the remain-
ing jammers are not enough to satisfy the given threshold
constraints. The final output of the greedy algorithm is the
sequence D1, D2, · · · , Dl, which means that the algorithm
terminates after l iterations and the lifetime of the whole
jammer network is l.
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Fig. 3: Construct an optimal schedule by replacing Di with D
′
i
A. MRS Algorithm
In this subsection, we focus on the special case with only
unrechargeable jammers in the jammer network. We first
discuss the definition of the minimum reliable solution, then
give the proof that it is sufficient to make choices just from the
minimum reliable set, and finally present the MRS algorithm
and prove its correctness.
Definition 1. For any Mi ⊆ J , Mi is called a minimum
reliable solution if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) Mi ∈ R, which means Mi meets the threshold con-
straints (3) and (4);
(ii) ∀N ⊂ Mi, N /∈ R, which means N cannot meet the
threshold constraints (3) and (4).
The family of all the minimum reliable solutions is called the
minimum reliable set, denoted by M .
M = {Mi |Mi ∈ R and ∀N ⊂Mi, N /∈ R}.
Lemma 1. If a jammer is replaced by a new jammer with
more battery power, then the lifetime of the whole jammer
network will increase, or at least remain the same.
Lemma 2. Consider an optimal schedule D1, D2, · · · , Dl.
Suppose that one of the reliable set, without loss of gener-
ality, Di, is not a minimum reliable solution. Then we can
construct a new optimal schedule by replacing Di with the
corresponding minimum reliable solution D
′
i.
Proof. Since D
′
i is the minimum reliable solution correspond-
ing to Di, then D
′
i ⊂ Di. Let’s consider the schedule
D1, · · · , Di−1, D′i, · · · , as shown in Figure 3. After the ith
time slot, the remaining battery power of the whole network
is more than that under the original schedule. According to
Lemma 1, the remaining lifetime of the network is no less than
l− i, thus the total lifetime is at least l. Since D1, D2, · · · , Dl
is an optimal schedule, D1, · · · , Di−1, D′i, · · · is optimal,
too.
Based on what have been discussed above, when given an
optimal schedule, we can always find a new optimal schedule,
which includes only minimum reliable solutions, by replacing
all the reliable sets with corresponding minimum reliable
solutions. Then we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. We can always find an optimal schedule
D1, D2, · · · , Dl, such that for all Di, Di is a minimum
reliable solution, that is, Di ∈M .
Now we discuss the idea of MRS algorithm. Based on
the above corollary, only the minimum reliable set should
be considered to maximize the lifetime of the whole jammer
network. In the first phase of MRS algorithm, we need to
compute the minimum reliable set pertaining to the given
S, F and J . In the second phase, we should make a schedule
from that minimum reliable set, to determine which minimum
reliable solution should be active during each time instant.
Algorithm 1 MRS Algorithm
Input:
The set of jammers J ;
The boundary of storage S and fence F ;
Parameters: PT , PJ , δ1, δ2, B, c.
Output:
The final jamming schedule.
1: compute minimum reliable set M ;
2: construct the ILP model based on constraints of life span;
3: compute the ILP problem approximately;
Let J = {j1, j2, · · · , jn} denotes the set of jammers, and
W = {w1, w2, · · · , wn} is the corresponding life span of
each jammer. Suppose that M = {M1,M2, · · · ,Mm} is the
computed minimum reliable set, and Res = 〈n1, n2, · · · , nm〉
is the optimal solution of the minimum reliable set, which
means the output schedule of jammers is the following se-
quence, n1M1, n2M2, · · · , nmMm. Then the total lifetime is∑m
k=1 nk. The following indicator function IMk(ji) shows
whether jammer ji is contained in Mk or not.
∀ji ∈ J, IMk(ji) =
{
1, ji is in Mk;
0, ji is not in Mk.
Once a jammer runs out of battery power, it would die
and can not be active anymore. Since all of the jammers are
unrechargeable and the battery power could not increase, each
jammer has a limited life span. Thus the following constraints
must be satisfied.
∀ji ∈ J,
m∑
k=1
IMk(ji)nk ≤ wi.
The lifetime of the network can be formulated as l =∑m
k=1 nk. Then the optimization goal of the problem is
to maximize the lifetime l. This is a typical integer linear
programming problem and can be solved approximately in
polynomial time.
For example, assume that J={a, b, c, d, e, f}, W={2, 2, 2, 2,
2, 2}, the minimum reliable set M = {M1,M2,M3}, and the
minimum reliable solutions M1 = {a, b, c, e}, M2 = {a, c, d},
M3 = {b, f}. Then the life span constraints can be shown as
follow: 
n1 + n2 ≤ wa = 2,
n1 + n3 ≤ wb = 2,
n1 + n2 ≤ wc = 2,
n2 ≤ wd = 2,
n1 ≤ we = 2,
n3 ≤ wf = 2.
The goal is to maximize
l = n1 + n2 + n3.
Under the settings mentioned above, if we make choices
from the given minimum reliable set, Res = 〈1, 1, 1〉 is a
feasible solution with lifetime l = 3, while Res∗ = 〈0, 2, 2〉 is
the optimal solution and the corresponding maximum lifetime
is l∗ = 4. However, if we do not make any schedule and rudely
activate all jammers in each time slot, then the lifetime of the
whole jammer network is just l = 2.
B. Greedy Algorithm
In this subsection, we focus on the most general cases with
both unrechargeable jammers and rechargeable ones in the
network. Given storage S, fence F and the set of jammers
J , we hope to determine a jamming schedule D1, D2, · · · , Dl
such that l is maximized. As mentioned above, the jamming
network is a hybrid structure of unrechargeable jammers
and rechargeable ones. The unrechargeable jammers have
two different modes, active and sleeping. An unrechargeable
jammer consumes c units of energy when active and maintains
a constant energy when sleeping. Similarly, the rechargeable
jammers have three modes, active, sleeping, and charging. A
rechargeable jammer acts the same as unrechargeable jammer
does when active or sleeping, and gains one unit of energy
when charging. It is worth to note that, a rechargeable jammer
is in charging mode by default when not active, and is sleeping
only when full charged and not active. The greedy strategy is
to minimize the amount of consumed energy units minus the
amount of increased energy units, denoted by ∆, under the
given threshold constraints in each time slot. Each iteration
can be described by an ILP model.
We denote the set of unrechargeable jammers as JU ⊂ J
and the set of rechargeable jammers as JR ⊂ J . Apparently,
JU ∪ JR = J . According to the remaining battery power
of each jammer, the set of jammers J can be divided into
three groups: dead jammers Jd, full charged jammers Jf and
other normal jammers Jn. We use binary variables ci for each
jammer i ∈ J to indicate whether i is chosen to be active or not
in a time instant. Note that only chosen jammers with ci = 1
are activated to secure legitimate communication inside the
storage. Thus the threshold constraints (3) and (4) should be
modified with ci taken into account. The modified constraints
are listed as follows:
∀s ∈ S, PT∑
i∈J ciPJ ‖i− s‖−γ
≥ δ1,
∀p ∈ F, PT d(p, S)
−γ∑
i∈J ciPJ ‖i− p‖−γ
≤ δ2.
That is to say,
∀s ∈ S,
∑
i∈J
ci ‖i− s‖−γ ≤ PT
PJδ1
, (5)
∀p ∈ F,
∑
i∈J
ci ‖i− p‖−γ ≥ PT d(p, S)
−γ
PJδ2
. (6)
According to the proportion of rechargeable jammers in
J , we can divide the problem into three different situations,
i.e., pure unrechargeable jammers(UJs), pure rechargeable
jammers(RJs), and the hybrid of UJs and RJs.
1) Pure UJs: Since there are no rechargeable jammers in
the jammer network, the increased energy must be zero. Then
the greedy strategy is to minimize
∆ =
∑
i∈Jf∪Jn
c · ci = c
∑
i∈Jf∪Jn
ci.
2) Pure RJs: Remember that rechargeable jammers can be
active, charging or sleeping. Then the greedy strategy is to
minimize
∆ =
∑
i∈Jn
[c · ci − (1− ci)] +
∑
i∈Jf
c · ci
= (c+ 1)
∑
i∈Jn
ci + c
∑
i∈Jf
ci − |Jn| .
3) The hybrid of UJs and RJs: For all jammers in JU , the
total energy consumption is
∆U =
∑
i∈JU∩(Jf∪Jn)
c · ci.
For other jammers in JR, the energy decrease is
∆R =
∑
i∈JR∩Jn
[c · ci − (1− ci)] +
∑
i∈JR∩Jf
c · ci.
Then the greedy strategy is to minimize
∆ =∆U + ∆R
=c
∑
i∈JU∩(Jf∪Jn)
ci + (c+ 1)
∑
i∈JR∩Jn
ci
+c
∑
i∈JR∩Jf
ci − |JR ∩ Jn| .
Algorithm 2 Greedy Algorithm
Input:
The set of jammers J ;
The remaining battery of each jammer, B[1 : |J |];
Parameters: PT , PJ , δ1, δ2.
Output:
The final jamming schedule, D.
1: D ← φ;
2: j ← 0;
3: while (true) do
4: Initial c[1 : |J |];
5: Compute ILP result such that ∆ is minimized;
6: if (ILP result 6= NULL) then
7: Update B[1 : |J |];
8: j ← j + 1;
9: D[j]← φ;
10: for i← 1 to |J | do
11: if (c[i] = 1) then
12: D[j]← D[j] ∪ {i};
13: end if
14: end for
15: D ← D ∪ {D[j]};
16: else
17: return D;
18: end if
19: end while
As discussed above, we have three different optimization
goals pertaining to different situations in each iteration. What
calls for special attention is that all of the three optimization
functions are linear, and the constraints (5) and (6) are linear
inequalities, too. So the optimization problem in each iteration
becomes a typical ILP problem and can be solved approxi-
mately in polynomial time with a certain approximation ratio.
In each time slot, the algorithm computes the near optimal
solution of the above ILP problem, denoted by Di, which
forms the final sequence of jamming schedule. Suppose the
total number of iterations is l. On the termination of the
algorithm, the sequence D1, D2, · · · , Dl is the ultimate output
and the corresponding lifetime is l.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Complexity of Greedy Algorithm
The complexity of our greedy algorithm is dominated by the
complexity of approximately solving the ILP problem and the
number of iterations. Firstly, to approximately solve an ILP
problem, a famous approach is to compute the corresponding
LP problem, and then round the solution of LP as the final
solution of the ILP problem. According to [27], the best
performance of the LP solver is O(n3) using Ye’s algorithm,
where n is the number of variables. Secondly, note that the
total battery power of all the jammers is nB, where n is the
number of jammers and B is the initial battery power of each
jammer. In each time slot, the whole jammer network will
consume at least one unit of energy (otherwise the network
could continue working forever), thus the number of iterations,
or lifetime, is no more than nB. Hence, the complexity of our
greedy algorithm is O(Bn4).
B. Pruning Strategy
In this subsection, we present a naive method to estimate the
range of the number of active jammers in each time instant.
The estimation result can be utilized to reduce the operation
steps in our algorithms. The method gives the upper bound
of the number of active jammers by computing the range of
distance from jammers to points s on S, and shows the lower
bound by determining the range of distance from jammers to
points p on F .
For any node s on the boundary of S, the distance from
a jammer j to it, denoted by ‖j − s‖, meets the following
inequality:
min
j∈J
‖j − s‖ ≤ ‖j − s‖ ≤ max
j∈J
‖j − s‖ ,
then we can deduce from Formula (5) the following statement:
(max
j∈J
‖j − s‖)−γ
∑
j∈J
cj ≤
∑
j∈J
cj ‖j − s‖−γ ≤ PT
PJδ1
,
then, ∑
j∈J
cj ≤ PT
PJδ1
(max
j∈J
‖j − s‖)γ ,∀s ∈ S,
thus, we get the upper bound of the number of active jammers∑
j∈J
cj ≤ min
s∈S
PT
PJδ1
(max
j∈J
‖j − s‖)γ .
Analogously, we have the following inequality deduced from
Formula (6) that for any node p on the boundary of F ,
(min
j∈J
‖j − p‖)−γ
∑
j∈J
cj ≥
∑
j∈J
cj ‖j − p‖−γ ≥ PT d(p, S)
−γ
PJδ2
,
then, ∑
j∈J
cj ≥ PT d(p, S)
−γ
PJδ2
(min
j∈J
‖j − p‖)γ ,∀p ∈ F,
R1 Rc+1R2  
Fig. 4: c+1 disjoint reliable sets works in a round-robin fashion
consequently we get the lower bound∑
j∈J
cj ≥ max
p∈F
PT d(p, S)
−γ
PJδ2
(min
j∈J
‖j − p‖)γ .
Based on the analysis above, the number of active jammers
during each time slot should be bounded within the estimated
upper and lower bound. In other words, any jammer set with
less or more jammers would not meet the constraints (3) and
(4) and should be excluded. Thus the steps needed in the
algorithms could be reduced.
C. Analysis of Lifetime
In this subsection, we discuss the issue whether the jammer
network can continue working forever or not, or in other
words, whether the lifetime can be prolonged indefinitely.
Since unrechargeable jammers can only consume energy but
can not be charged, the number of time slots during which they
are active is limited by the initial battery power B and the
rate of energy consumption c. Specifically, an unrechargeable
jammer can be chosen to cause interference for at most
⌊
B
c
⌋
times and would die then. Therefore, whether an unlimited
lifetime can be reached or not mainly depends on the number
of rechargeable jammers.
Analogous to the Maximum Disjoint Set Covers problem
studied in [20], [28], if we find c+ 1 disjoint reliable subsets
of JR, denoted by {R1, R2, · · · , Rc+1}, then these subsets
could be activated in turn, in a round-robin fashion, such
that during each time slot only one subset is responsible for
securing the communication, while all other jammers are in
sleeping or charging mode. As shown in Figure 4, consider a
period of c+ 1 successive time slots, each subset of jammers
would be active for only one slot and charging for c slots.
From the global perspective, the remaining battery power
of each jammer would remain constant after a period. That
is to say, the whole jammer network does not suffer from
energy decrease and could keep working successfully forever.
However, if no such c+ 1 disjoint reliable subsets are found,
then each jammer does not have enough time to refill the
already consumed c units of energy, thus the remaining battery
power of each jammer would decrease and finally run out. As
a result of that, the jammer network would die eventually.
Given the storage S, fence F and the randomly deployed
jammers J , we can determine the least number of active
jammers , Ljam, to satisfy the threshold constraints, just as
mentioned above. If the total number of rechargeable jammers
is less than (c + 1)Ljam, then it is obviously impossible to
find such {R1, R2, · · · , Rc+1}, hence we can assert that the
jammer network would die eventually; otherwise, it is possible
to make an unlimited schedule for the network. Unfortunately,
since the budget is restricted and the rechargeable jammers
Fig. 5: Storage(grey shaded area)/Fence(black line) model with
randomly deployed jammers(red dots)
are much costlier than unrechargeable ones, the proportion
of rechargeable jammers should be quite limited. So it is
reasonable to assume that the network lifetime is limited in
our work. Future work will focus on the relationship between
unlimited lifetime and the proportion of rechargeable jammers.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup
In this section, we conduct extensive simulations to evaluate
the performance of our greedy algorithm under different net-
work settings. The basic geographical setting we have chosen
is shown in Figure 5. The fence F is a 100m× 100m square
area, and the storage S is a 25m×25m area located right in the
middle of F . According to the discretization strategy of both
F and S in [3], we set the step size λ as 2m, then the boundary
of S and F can be divided into a discrete set of spots. We
simulate a jammer network with both unrechargeable jammers
and rechargeable jammers randomly located in F\S. In this
simulation, we consider the following tunable parameters:
• n, the number of jammers. We vary the number of
randomly deployed jammers between 30 and 120 to study
the relation between network lifetime and density of
jammers. The default value is n = 100.
• PJ , the jamming power of all jammers. We vary PJ
between 0.1 and 10 to study the effect of jamming power
on the network lifetime. The default value is PJ = 1.
• B, the life span of each jammer. It varies between 1 and
10. The default value is B = 10.
• δ2, the threshold level indicating how much capable the
eavesdropper is. We vary δ2 between 0.1 and 0.9. The
default value is δ2 = 0.5.
• η, the percentage of rechargeable jammers in the whole
set of jammers. It varies between 0 and 0.8. The default
value is η = 0.
• c, the rate of energy consumption of each jammer. It
varies between 4 and 20. The default value is c = 10.
We implement our greedy algorithm with C++ and use
the optimization toolbox in LINGO to solve the linear pro-
gramming. For each setting of the parameters, we repeat the
experiment 5 times for different jammers’ random deployment.
The base value of lifetime under the hypothesis that all
jammers are active in each time slot is used as reference.
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B. Analysis of Simulation Results
In Figure 6, we present the network lifetime computed by
the greedy algorithm, depending on the number of randomly
distributed jammers n, which varies between 30 and 120 with
an increment of 10. Network lifetime returned by the greedy
algorithm increases nearly linearly with the increase of jammer
density and is far greater than the base value 10. When more
jammers are deployed, a jammer in a reliable subset can be
replaced by more alternatives, then more such reliable subsets
can be found, consequently a longer lifetime can be achieved.
In Figure 7, we study the impact of the jamming power
on network lifetime. We consider 100 randomly distributed
jammers and vary the jamming power PJ from 0.1 to 20. The
graph shows that the jamming power has a great impact on
network lifetime. The lifetime increases rapidly when jamming
power grows from 0.1 to about 6, and maintains stable when
jamming power is 6 to 10, then decreases when jamming
power exceeds 10. Since both the SINR of eavesdroppers and
the SINR of legitimate nodes are determined by the jamming
power, when the jamming power increases appropriately, the
number of jammers needed to successfully interfere eaves-
droppers decreases, consequently network lifetime becomes
longer. However, when the jamming power grows too large,
it is difficult to guarantee the legitimate nodes from being
disturbed, hence the lifetime will suffer a decline.
In Figure 8, we measure the network lifetime when the
life span of each jammer varies between 1 and 10 with an
increment of 1. We consider 100 jammers randomly deployed.
The lifetime increases proportionally to the life span of each
jammer and far exceeds the base value .
Figure 9 shows the relationship between network lifetime
and the threshold level δ2, which indicates how much more
capable the eavesdropper is over the legitimate nodes. When
δ2 grows, the eavesdropper becomes less capable, then fewer
jammers are needed to secure the communication, thus the
network lifetime will increase.
In Figure 10, we study the impact of the percentage of
rechargeable jammers η on network lifetime. We consider
100 randomly deployed jammers and vary the percentage of
rechargeable jammers between 0 and 0.8 with an increment of
0.1. The rate of energy consumption is set to be 10 or 20. The
lifetime grows slowly with η between 0 and 0.5, but increases
rapidly when η exceeds 0.5. Under the same percentage of
rechargeable jammers, the lifetime with c = 10 is larger than
lifetime with c = 20. When more rechargeable jammers are
deployed, more jammers will be recharged during each time
slot, and hence the network lifetime can be prolonged. And
smaller rate of consumption means shorter charging period,
thus longer lifetime. It is worth to note that, when η is greater
than a certain threshold, we can find a series of disjoint reliable
subsets such that when those subsets are activated in a round-
robin fashion, the network lifetime is infinite.
In Figure 11, we measure the network lifetime when the
rate of energy consumption of each jammer, c, varies between
4 and 20 with an increment of 2. We consider 100 randomly
deployed jammers and the percentage of rechargeable jammers
is 0.1 or 0.5. Note that to avoid the impact of life span, we
assume the life span of each jammer is the constant 10. The
network lifetime decreases rapidly when c is small and remains
stable when c is large enough. When the energy consumption
rate is small and the percentage of rechargeable jammers is
large, the energy consumed during one time slot will be refilled
quickly, thus the lifetime will be longer, even infinite.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Wireless communication systems are increasingly adopted
to transfer potential highly sensitive information, but are easy
to be cracked or eavesdropped by adversaries due to the shared
nature of wireless medium. Adding artificial noises by friendly
jammers is a feasible way to protect the communication
systems. This paper studies the schedule strategies of randomly
deployed friendly jammers, which can be unrechargeable or
rechargeable, to maximize the lifetime of the jammer networks
and prevent the cracking of jamming effect made by the
eavesdroppers. An ILP-based approximation algorithm is first
proposed as baseline, then a heuristic algorithm based on the
greedy strategy that less consumption leads to longer lifetime
is also proposed with lower complexity. The theoretical anal-
ysis and extensive simulations show that our algorithms are
effective and efficient. This work may be extended to randomly
schedule the activities of jammers in the future.
REFERENCES
[1] D. S. Alberts, J. J. Garstka, and F. P. Stein, “Network centric warfare:
Developing and leveraging information superiority.” DTIC Document,
Tech. Rep., 2000.
[2] D. Malan, T. Fulford-Jones, M. Welsh, and S. Moulton, “Codeblue:
An ad hoc sensor network infrastructure for emergency medical care,”
in International workshop on wearable and implantable body sensor
networks, vol. 5, 2004.
[3] K. Abu-Affash, A. Efrat, S. David, V. Polishchuk, and M. Segal,
“Optimization schemes for protective jamming,” in In MobiHoc, 2012.
[4] Y. Allouche, Y. Cassuto, A. Efrat, M. Segal, E. M. Arkin, G. Grebla,
J. S. Mitchell, and S. Sankararaman, “Secure communication through
jammers jointly optimized in geography and time,” in Proceedings of
the 16th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking
and Computing. ACM, 2015, pp. 227–236.
[5] N. O. Tippenhauer, L. Malisa, A. Ranganathan, and S. Capkun, “On
limitations of friendly jamming for confidentiality,” in Security and
Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 160–173.
[6] A. S. Wander, N. Gura, H. Eberle, V. Gupta, and S. C. Shantz, “Energy
analysis of public-key cryptography for wireless sensor networks,”
in Third IEEE international conference on pervasive computing and
communications. IEEE, 2005, pp. 324–328.
[7] Z. Lu, W. Wang, and C. Wang, “From jammer to gambler: Modeling and
detection of jamming attacks against time-critical traffic,” in INFOCOM,
2011 Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2011, pp. 1871–1879.
[8] M. Li, I. Koutsopoulos, and R. Poovendran, “Optimal jamming attacks
and network defense policies in wireless sensor networks,” in IEEE
INFOCOM 2007-26th IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications. IEEE, 2007, pp. 1307–1315.
[9] V. Navda, A. Bohra, S. Ganguly, and D. Rubenstein, “Using channel
hopping to increase 802.11 resilience to jamming attacks,” in IEEE
INFOCOM 2007-26th IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications. IEEE, 2007, pp. 2526–2530.
[10] J. P. Vilela, P. C. Pinto, and J. Barros, “Jammer selection policies for
secure wireless networks,” in 2011 IEEE International Conference on
Communications Workshops (ICC). IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–6.
[11] W. Shen, P. Ning, X. He, and H. Dai, “Ally friendly jamming: How
to jam your enemy and maintain your own wireless connectivity at the
same time,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on.
IEEE, 2013, pp. 174–188.
[12] J. P. Vilela, M. Bloch, J. Barros, and S. W. McLaughlin, “Wireless se-
crecy regions with friendly jamming,” IEEE Transactions on information
forensics and security, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 256–266, 2011.
[13] J. P. Vilela and J. Barros, “Collision-free jamming for enhanced wire-
less secrecy,” in World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks
(WoWMoM), 2013 IEEE 14th International Symposium and Workshops
on a. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–6.
[14] I. Martinovic, P. Pichota, and J. B. Schmitt, “Jamming for good: a fresh
approach to authentic communication in wsns,” in Proceedings of the
second ACM conference on Wireless network security. ACM, 2009,
pp. 161–168.
[15] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “The relay–eavesdropper channel: Cooperation
for secrecy,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 54, no. 9,
pp. 4005–4019, 2008.
[16] Z. Han, N. Marina, M. Debbah, and A. Hjørungnes, “Physical layer
security game: interaction between source, eavesdropper, and friendly
jammer,” EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Network-
ing, vol. 2009, no. 1, p. 1, 2010.
[17] A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst, “Jamming games in the mimo
wiretap channel with an active eavesdropper,” IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 82–91, 2013.
[18] S. Goel and R. Negi, “Guaranteeing secrecy using artificial noise,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 2180–2189,
2008.
[19] E. Arkin, Y. Cassuto, A. Efrat, G. Grebla, J. S. Mitchell, S. Sankarara-
man, and M. Segal, “Optimal placement of protective jammers for
securing wireless transmissions in a geographic domain,” in Proceedings
of the 14th International Conference on Information Processing in
Sensor Networks. ACM, 2015, pp. 37–46.
[20] M. Cardei and D.-Z. Du, “Improving wireless sensor network lifetime
through power aware organization,” Wireless Networks, vol. 11, no. 3,
pp. 333–340, 2005.
[21] S. Chen, P. Sinha, N. B. Shroff, and C. Joo, “Finite-horizon energy
allocation and routing scheme in rechargeable sensor networks,” in
INFOCOM, 2011 Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2011, pp. 2273–2281.
[22] ——, “A simple asymptotically optimal energy allocation and routing
scheme in rechargeable sensor networks,” in INFOCOM, 2012 Proceed-
ings IEEE. IEEE, 2012, pp. 379–387.
[23] S. Guo, C. Wang, and Y. Yang, “Mobile data gathering with wireless
energy replenishment in rechargeable sensor networks,” in INFOCOM,
2013 Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1932–1940.
[24] L. Fu, P. Cheng, Y. Gu, J. Chen, and T. He, “Minimizing charging
delay in wireless rechargeable sensor networks,” in INFOCOM, 2013
Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2013, pp. 2922–2930.
[25] R.-S. Liu, P. Sinha, and C. E. Koksal, “Joint energy management and
resource allocation in rechargeable sensor networks,” in INFOCOM,
2010 Proceedings IEEE. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–9.
[26] S. He, J. Chen, F. Jiang, D. K. Yau, G. Xing, and Y. Sun, “Energy pro-
visioning in wireless rechargeable sensor networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Mobile Computing, vol. 12, no. 10, pp. 1931–1942, 2013.
[27] Y. Ye, “An o (n 3 l) potential reduction algorithm for linear program-
ming,” Mathematical programming, vol. 50, no. 1-3, pp. 239–258, 1991.
[28] S. Slijepcevic and M. Potkonjak, “Power efficient organization of
wireless sensor networks,” in Communications, 2001. ICC 2001. IEEE
International Conference on, vol. 2. IEEE, 2001, pp. 472–476.
